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New Past for the Sake of a Better Future:  
Re-inventing the history of the Kirant in East Nepal  
 
 
Grégoire Schlemmer 
 
In the Hindu kingdom of Nepal, official history was for a long time only the 
genealogy of ruling dynasties, and it focused mainly on national unification. 
This phenomenon reflects the domination of the Indo-Nepalese in the 
country, which was unified through conquest in the second part of the 
eighteenth century. Consequently ethnic populations, as well as low castes, 
were rejected for a long time as marginal and prevented from holding any 
kind of influential function, and also from writing a history of their own. 
With the democratic revolution in 1990, which has led to the emergence of 
freedom of expression, ethnic minorities now want their share of the cake, 
and they fight for social, economic and political recognition. While 
traditionally any wish to elevate one’s position in society implied a full 
adherence to the high caste model, now perhaps the only common feature of 
their claims is to question the Brahman domination in the country, the so-
called Bāhunvād (‘Brahmanocraty’).1 The wishes of ethnic minorities are 
founded on claims of a common identity and culture, and one of the 
privileged ways to express this is through possessing a proper history. 
Indeed, for the Kirant (which is one of these ethnic groups)2 a new past is 
emerging, written in Nepali or English, portrayed in booklets, and 
sometimes found on various web sites. These publications are my main 
                                                 
1 Nepal is officially a “Hindu Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom.” Brahmans constituted 
around 13 percent of a total population of more than twenty two million inhabitants in 
2001.  The Chetri or ‘warrior’ caste equivalent to the Indian Kṣatriya, who share with the 
Brahmans the status of a ‘pure’ caste, – make up around 16 percent of the population. 
Comparatively, the ‘ethnic groups’ category of the census constitutes a third of the 
population (the others being mainly other castes and religious groups;  Gurung 1998). 
High castes exert much of the political but also economic and cultural power. On the 
relation between Brahmans and the state, see Bouillier 1995. On bāhunvād as a main 
factor of discrimination against the marginalized groups, see Lawoti 2001. On the 
perception of this phenomenon by indigenists themselves, see Tamang 1999.  
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2 This name can be written Kirāt, Kirāta, Kirti, Kiranti… To simplify the reading I have 
decided to use the term Kirant, and to use Kirāta when referring specifically to the old 
ruling dynasty (see below). The same applies to the word mundhum (written mudhum, 
muddhum…). Nepali, if rendered in italics, is transliterated according to Turner’s system.  
EBHR 25/26 120 
 
                                                
sources of information.3 Through an analysis of these documents, this article 
attempts to describe how Kirant indigenists view their history in this new 
political context.  
I use the term “indigenist” to refer to intellectuals who write about 
(usually their own) ethnic groups, promoting their culture, identity, and 
rights in the nation. They are usually cut off from most of the rural Kirant, 
but present themselves as spokespersons for their groups. So the rewriting of 
history is not initiated in rural Kirant: all discourses I will present came from 
a minority of partially uprooted intellectuals.4 This fact leads us to ask how 
urbanized and uprooted people perceive the culture they want to promote, 
comparing the rural life they leave behind and an urban middle class they 
emulate. Rejecting official history, Kirant indigenists try to write their own 
history by setting themselves up as a dignified nation.5 But given the lack of 
documents concerning the history of Kirant, how can these indigenists 
pretend to write an attested history? We shall see how this past emerges 
from of a mix of sources, like the traditional myths collected among elders of 
the community (which can be considered as one kind of ‘local history’), and 
other materials, such as researchers’ books, classical Sanskrit literature 
(such as the Mahābhārata), as well as royal chronicles. I will try to show 
how indigenists deal with these sources and how they express their history 
and identity.  
 
3 I should also note that data used for this article were collected in the field (between 1996 
and 2002), but this subject was not my main concern at that time (my main research topic 
is the religious organization of the Kulung Rai, one of the remotest Rai groups).  
4 A similar topic has already been dealt with by M. Gaenszle (2002), who shows a 
development from a “spatio-temporal production of locality” in a traditional context to a 
“translocal anchorage of Kirant identity” based on the affirmation of a distinct culture. The 
present article, more focused on political aspects of the rewriting of history and culture 
around the notion of Kirant, can be read as a continuation of his article.  
5 Of course, not all these intellectuals are motivated by a unique and clear goal. There are 
different opinions, different ways to act and write, and also numerous contradictions, 
showing that views are emergent. Differences exist between Rai and Limbu writers (two 
major groups constituting the Kirant entity) and amongst Rai authors, who generally 
adopt a more traditional approach: they refer to their own village traditions (Bam 
Bahadur), deal mainly with their own group (Bhupadhwaj, Kandangwa), and express their 
personal points of view (Bhuidal Rai, Nepal Khambu), sometimes being very vindictive 
(Tanka Bahadur). In contrast, Limbu authors (S. Subba, Kainla, and T.B. Subba) have an 
academic style, even though they sometimes evince a militant tendency. It could be due to 
Chemjong’s influence (the most famous Limbu intellectual, appointed professor at the 
university of Kathmandu in 1961; see Gaenszle 2002), but it can be more generally 
explained by the Limbu’s higher social and economic integration, both in Nepal and in 
India. The majority of those Limbu writers were born far from the traditional Limbu area, 
have studied in India (Darjeeling, Bengal or elsewhere) and are still linked to universities, 
where some of them are teachers. On the other side, Rai authors are mainly born in Rai 
villages, did their (shorter) studies in Kathmandu and are not linked to any academic 
institutions. But they all live in cities and were educated outside their traditional culture, 
which explains why they express their wish to know more about their own culture. 
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Introduction: The rise of ethnic movements and intellectuals 
Kirant is a generic word used to designate related ethnic groups mainly 
located in the mountains of East Nepal but also numerous in Sikkim and 
Darjeeling (India). They number approximately one million (around five 
percent of the Nepalese population) and speak languages belonging to 
Tibeto-Burman. Kirant culture is clearly different from the Tibetan and 
Indo-Nepalese ones, although it has been influenced by them through long 
term contacts. The Kirant are mainly composed of Rāi (also called Khambu) 
and of Limbu people (also called Yakthumba).  
During the second part of the 18th century, King Prithvi Narayan Shah, 
the founder of the modern Nepali state, conquered present-day Nepal. After 
a few years of violent war in which the king was confronted with strong 
armed resistance, he included the Kirant area in his kingdom. To conciliate 
these turbulent groups, he granted them a certain amount of political and 
cultural autonomy with regard to land ownership. But these privileges have 
progressively been withdrawn due to a slow but continuous process of land 
spoliation, limitation of political rights, and imposition of a strict Hindu 
model (Caplan 1970, Sagant 1975). Actually, less than a third of the 
population in the traditional Kirant settlement area are Kirant. These 
political, demographical and economical factors (all linked to control of 
peoples and resources) are of course fundamental for understanding the 
birth of indigenist movements (see, among others, Weiner 1978).  
Resistance movements have appeared since Prithvi Narayan Shah’s 
conquest, but because of the government’s repression and a ban on any kind 
of demonstration, they were not very well organized.6 Nevertheless, ethnic 
claims were upheld by the emigrant communities outside Nepal. The 
relative liberty of expression, coupled with an already existing ethnic 
awareness of the Limbu community, explains the early rise of Kirant ethnic 
movements in Sikkim in the second half of the 19th century.7 These 
 
6 Nevertheless, during the Rana period (1846-1950) political meetings were periodically 
organized in the hills, sometimes leading to sporadic revolts. Rai leaders like Ram Prasad 
participated in the 1950 armed revolution against ‘Ranarchy’ (Rai 2051). At that time, Rai 
and Limbu armed units wanted to drive high caste peoples out of some Kirant villages. 
During the thirties and forties, another important movement was by Phalgunanda, a 
Limbu former adept of Jasmāni (a devotional bhakti sect). He created a new Kirant 
religion, drawing on puritan principles (vegetarianism and a ban on alcohol) and Limbu 
traditions and scripts. It became fairly well spread, and several temples were built, but it 
was in the end strongly persecuted as an oppositional movement, apparently because it 
began to revive Limbu nationalism (Jones 1976, Pradhan 1991: 171). There are still some 
adepts of this movement (Subba 1999: 116). Finally, sporadic political resistance 
movements (mainly lead by members of the Congress and Communist parties) appear 
between the revolutions of the fifties and the nineties, like the 1974 armed struggle in 
Okhaldunga involving several Rai; see “Human Rights Movement 1961-1991” web site. 
7 During the middle of the 17th century, the new Tibetan rulers of Sikkim unified the 
Lepcha (the ‘native’ population of Sikkim) and the local Limbu under the 
Lhomontsongsum, the association of the Tibetans (Lho), the Lepchas (Mon) and the 
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movements were officially campaigning for the preservation of the Kirant 
language and culture, but were also fora for political discussions.  
Over and above the Hindu and Buddhist influences on their social 
environment, Kirant intellectuals have been affected by different kinds of 
discourse. First, the British cultural, linguistic and historical studies carried 
out on Kirant were widely re-appropriated, in form as well as in content, and 
quoted by indigenists8. The second source of influence was Christianity, 
spread through British schools where some members of the local elite were 
educated. Even if not converted, some intellectuals (such as Chemjong) used 
Christianity as a model and as a source of inspiration, perhaps because it 
showed the possibility of the existence of a respectful religion, different from 
Hinduism and Buddhism. And thirdly, leftist movements played an 
important role in inspiring oppositional forces from the beginning of the 
century (Subba 1992).  They often tint indigenist discourse with social 
demands. All these influences are still present in the way indigenists define 
themselves.  
A fourth factor is perhaps coming from ethnic movements in India, both 
the tribal messianic movements (which share numerous similarities with the 
Kirant one, see Fuchs 1965) and, more surprisingly, the Hindu nationalist 
movements, which fight to “re-establish the Hindu nation in its superior and 
glorious splendour” (Pandey 1993: 240). It is difficult to know how far such 
movements influence Kirant intellectuals (no explicit reference is made to 
them), but several shared features exist between Kirant and Hindu 
nationalists from India. Reification of the Country, the Community, the 
Religion (all existing naturally and similarly since the beginning of time), 
anchoring the population in a territory (Hindus are the natives of the 
fatherland of India, in contrast to Muslims or Christians), the necessary link 
between a nation and a religion, or even the emphasis on the military values 
(bāhubala, the physical strength): all these points characterizing Hindu 
nationalist movements (Pandey 1993) are, as we will see, also fundamental 
features of the Kirant indigenist movements.  
 
Limbu (Tsong). Organised on the basis of Tibetan values, this association tried to 
conciliate newly conquered groups but did not give real power to them. In any case, this 
endowed the Limbu with a sense of identity, and limited their absorption into the well-
organized Gorkhali (e.g. Nepali) identity movement that appeared in Sikkim during the 
19th century. Indeed, despite the Sikkimese government’s wish to federate all centrifugal 
forces in the country, Nepalese from all groups (numerous in Sikkim) organized as a 
political and cultural entity. Kirant could then play on both fields: they were members of 
the Gorkhali associations and also claimed membership in the autochthonous community 
of Sikkim (Subba 1999). 
8 Campbell, Hamilton, Kirkpatrick and Hogdson are the most often quoted (e.g. R.K. Rai 
1998). Some are thanked (as Hodgson, who wrote that Kirant are one of the most 
interesting groups of the Himalayas), and some are criticised (as Hansson, for having 
shown the linguistic diversity of Rai, e.g. their disunity). These examples show the 
difficulty of carrying out neutral research under these conditions: one is either for the 
Kirant cause, or against it. 
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After the democratic revolution of 1990, indigenist movements (locally 
known as janajāti) gained new strength. Freedom of expression made room 
for the creation of diverse Kirant organisations. They all claim Kirant unity, 
but their multiplication reflects the endemic fragmentation of Kirant society. 
Although there are real cultural links between all Kirant groups, there has 
never been an ‘emotional community’ (Subba 1990), and these 
differentiations are a major handicap for the creation of a strong and unified 
community.9 These new ethnic organisations, officially motivated by cultural 
goals, coordinated political activities by establishing contacts between 
associations of the same type (some were united in the Forum for the Rights 
of All Nationalities that fought especially for a better political participation 
of ethnic minorities) and with foreign researchers, NGOs, the UN, members 
of the political parties, or the Maoist movement.  
 
I. Rewriting history 
 
a. Extension of Kirant: From clanic factionalism to pan-Mongol unity  
In their books the first question the indigenists try to answer is often: who 
are the Kirant and where did they come from? In the absence of material 
evidence, the name of a group is sometimes the major basis for re-thinking 
history. For a long time there have been debates concerning the extension of 
the label "Kirant". Behind the question; “who are the Kirant?” there is a 
debate on identity leading to the question of legitimacy concerning the 
presence of different ethnic groups on Nepalese soil.  
The term Kirant is not an endonym. It is an old Sanskrit word that 
apparently had two main meanings. The first one can be rendered as 
"highlanders"; it also referred to a form of Shiva (Frédéric 1987: 632). There 
is a complex link between this god, mountains, and tribal people (see 
below). The second (and apparently more common) meaning referred in a 
depreciating generic sense to Himalayan tribes, without further precision.10 
 
9 This fragmentation even concerns each sub-community of the Kirant entity. The unity of 
the Limbu community is stronger than that of the Rai. Symptomatically, despite 
variations, the Limbu language is one while more than 20 Rai languages are identified 
(Hansson 1991, Driem 2002). Limbu culture and political organisation is more unified, 
perhaps because of the old centralizing influence of Sikkim. Similarly, in Sikkim there is a 
Rai group unified by a shared culture and a feeling of being one group. This unity probably 
results from the coexistence of migrants from different Rai groups: it certainly leads to the 
formation of a common Rai culture through cultural homogenisation and attenuation of 
differences. This is one more reason why Limbu and Kirant of Sikkim play an active part 
in the process of ethnic claims. 
10 For an analysis of its use in Sanskrit literature, see, among others, Lévi (1905), Rönow 
(1936) and Chatterjee (1998: 27-36); for the history of its application to Rai and Limbu 
populations, see Gaenszle (2000: 2-12, 92-96). It also should be noted that different 
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There is evidence of the term’s use in old texts, such as the Mahābhārata, 
Rāmāyaṇa, Purāṇa as well as Ptolemy’s writing. Later this word was used 
by the Nepalese to refer to the ethnic groups of East Nepal: especially the 
Rai and Limbu people. Its first documented occurrence in Nepal is in the 
gopālarājavaṃśāvalī, the genealogy of the herder kings, dating from the 
14/15th century (Bajracharya 1971: 139). In any case, the Rai and Limbu 
people themselves, followed by the indigenists, have progressively 
appropriated this word, transforming it into a federative endonym, and have 
reconstructed this notion by giving it a new extension.  
In Rai mythology, there is a common story explaining that the Kirant 
were originally four brothers. The first three (usually Rai, Limbu and, 
according to the group telling the story, Yakkha, Sunuwar, etc.) populated 
the Himalayas, while the last one stayed in the plains. Through this 
mythological lost brother, the Rai had the possibility to affiliate with 
different groups, and perhaps to be linked to a centre of power. Indeed, this 
fourth brother is often associated with the Meche and Koche, two 
populations from the plains who were apparently part of the Vijayanarayan 
kingdom, the earliest documented kingdom in East Nepal, going back to the 
time before the Sen rulers. This mythological period has been prolonged by 
indigenists; but rather than simply creating a link with populations from the 
plains, they rallied a large number of Asian populations around the banner 
of Kirant. Thus, indigenists were inspired by Western references containing 
different speculations of 19th century authors about physical, cultural and 
linguistic similarities between ‘Mongoloid populations’, with a view to 
building a theory of Asian people and the origin of human beings.  
Chemjong (1967) is the first author who embarked on such a 
hypothetical archaeological and etymological synthesis. Adopting 
Chaterjee’s terminology,11 he regroups all Mongoloid populations under the 
category of Kirant, and perceives them as an essence. Any Sanskrit reference 
to “Kirant” (or supposedly related words) becomes historical evidence for a 
very large proto-Kirant group spread all over Eurasia. As an example, since 
the Rai are sometimes called Khambu, sometimes written Kamboja, the 
conclusion given by Chemjong is that Cambodjia is populated by Kirant. 
Further, he quotes historians referring to an ancient population living close 
to the Mediterranean sea named Kereti, arguing that this can only be the 
 
Indian ethnic groups present themselves as being Kirant (as some Methei and Garo; 
Subba 1999: 26).  
11 Chatterjee is an Indian scholar. His book, published in 1951, is a historical work on 
“Indo-Mongoloid” groups (e.g. Tibeto-Burman speaking populations of India, a “group” he 
also calls “Kirata”) and their ‘contribution to the history and culture of India’. For 
indigenists, Chatterjee’s book has the great merit of integrating Mongoloid people in 
Indian history… and calling them Kirant! But in fact it is not a panegyric to Mongoloid 
people: in this book the main Mongoloid contribution to Indian history can be 
summarized as a common wish to be converted to Hinduism and an effort to defend this 
religion against Muslim invaders.  
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deformed name of Kirati. Finally Chemjong lists various hypotheses which 
lead him to see a Kirant origin and influence in all the ancient civilizations 
from the Mediterranean Sea to Mongolia or Cambodia, and so to claim all 
(cultural, social, architectural…) achievements of these populations (the 
Persian empire, Ankhor temples, etc.) as Kirant. For Chemjong and his 
numerous followers the historical anchorage and the guiding thread of their 
re-written history are confirmed by the recurrence of the word Kirant in all 
these references.  
Thus the re-adoption of the originally pejorative name of Kirant offers 
glorious perspectives to Rai and Limbu intellectuals. By this “translocal 
anchorage of Kiranti identity”, the major concern of Chemjong is to show 
that Kirant history dates back as far as that of others and that Kiranti 
culture is on an equal footing with the great traditions (Gaenszle 2002: 
340). But for some of his followers, like Tanka Bahadur Rai, the label Kirant 
becomes a synonym for the ‘mangol’ population,12 unifying all Nepalese 
ethnic groups by a common history and common interests. And by the 
simple fact that the Rai and Limbu still bear the name of Kirant, these 
populations acquire the status of the purest and archetypal representatives 
of this ethnic entity. It provides them with historical depth, a prestigious 
past, and origins that are used to express their autochthony and ethnic 
specificity in opposition to the “Arya” (e.g. Indo-Nepalese), the “invaders” 
associated with the Sanskrit heritage and India.  
 
b. Heritage and lost glory: The ancient nation of Kirant 
The structure of Rai mythology is linked to a spatial and temporal axis 
extending from their mythical birthplace to their actual living area. This 
axis, or path, has several landmarks: one in Varāhakṣetra, the confluence of 
three important rivers and also the site of a famous and ancient Hindu 
shrine (linked to the Sen rulers, Krauskopff and Deuel Meyer 2000: 115); 
and one in Halesi, which seemed to be an important Rai political centre. 
Both are major places of pilgrimage (for Halesi, see Macdonald 1986). But 
some versions also add other places: talking about migration a villager 
explained to me that the Rai went to Kathmandu where they ruled. This 
claim, present in almost all Kirant groups’ mythology, seems strange. 
However, we can read in a Nepalese scholar’s book that “There were 29 
kings of the Kirant dynasty who ruled over Nepal for about 1225 years” 
(from 900 B.C to 300 A.D); “They were the ancestors of the present day 
 
12 The word ‘Mangol’ stems from the Western scholars’ racial classification (mongoloid) of 
the Asian race (for example, some indigenists speak about “Mangolkirat nation”). In the 
Nepalese context, it refers to populations that western scholars actually call Tibeto-
Burmese, by reference to a linguistic classification. But some indigenists do incorporate 
Austro-Asiatic or Indo-Aryan populations, like the Tharu and some other populations 
from the plains who, according to some indigenists, share among others with Kirant their 
status of natives. 
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Kirant” (Uprety 1994: 15). The existence of this ruling dynasty in Nepal 
seems to be an accepted fact, proved by old inscriptions,13 even if there is no 
evidence that this dynasty has any link with the current Kirant, except for 
the term.14  
In any case, this fact, agreed upon by both Kirant indigenists and 
Nepalese scholars, is becoming a central element in the indigenist 
construction of memory and of the legitimacy of their culture. The chief 
consequence of this is to prove that “the first inhabitants of Nepal were 
Kirant”, even that they possessed “one of the oldest civilizations in the 
world”. Such affirmations of Kirant seniority can be found in almost all 
indigenist books. But they go further.  
Several books written by Kirant intellectuals give an idealistic 
description of this glorious time of the Kirant rulers. They make up a long 
list of the brilliant achievements of Kirant civilization: some point out the 
socio-economic development achieved by its rulers (clay and weaving, 
development of irrigation, business, ‘developed and scientific 
administration’ are all Kirant inventions…), showing the Kirant as 
“contributing enormously for the thriving of ancient civilization” (Subba 
1995: 17). One writer refers to the effects of this development: “because of its 
economic prosperity, people from different places, of different tribes and 
races came to Nepal and settled down” (www.infoclub.com.np/nepal), 
showing that this period was the origin of one of the oft-claimed 
characteristics of Nepal: its multiethnic composition. More frequent is the 
claim to greater social justice implemented by the Kirant: there was no 
social or gender discrimination, as in the caste system, and women were not 
subordinated to their husbands. As Bam Bahadur summarizes: “It seems 
that Kirāta have been practicing democratic socialism as their political 
system” (2055: 59). All those great achievements seem to be motivated by 
the high moral values of the Kirant race. Each author lists fundamental 
 
13 According to Slussser, the earliest evidence of a Kirāta dynasty in Nepal is the term 
‘Kirāta’ “in a newly discovered but disappointingly fragmentary description” (1982: 10). 
The first link between this Kirāta dynasty and the current Kirant is found in the genealogy 
of the Gopal Kings (gopālarājavaṃśāvalī), where we can read that, according to 
Vajracharya, “… there were 32 Kirata Kings. These Kiratas (now) inhabit the regions 
between the Tamakoshi and Arunakoshi rivers” (1971: 139). This implies that the link 
between the Kirāta dynasty and the actual Kirant population was extant in the fifteenth  
century.  
14 We have to remember that Kirant is a Sanskrit word used to name tribes from the 
mountains. There is toponymic evidence that the people of this dynasty were in fact 
Tibeto-Burman, but this does not prove Kirant ancestory; they could also be the ancestors 
of the Newar. Interestingly, the linguist van Driem actually classifies Kirant and Newar – 
but also Magar, Raute and Chepang – in a large linguistic family called Maha-Kiranti 
(Driem 2002, ethnologue.com). In fact, the current Kirant could be linked with the Kirāta 
dynasty, not in direct filiation, but as descendants of this larger Tibeto-Burman 
substratum. But this affiliation would have no more (and no less) meaning than, for 
example, to say Gauls are the ancestors of the current French.  
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values of the Kirant, the most common being bravery, frankness, strong 
sense of community, and solidarity, principles they present as intrinsic to 
their religion, the Kirant mudhum (some say Kirantism). To sum up the 
indigenist discourse: the Kirant, their nation and their culture, which are 
independent from India (“the Kirats had created their own civilised society 
before the Aryans reached Sapta Sindhu”, www.exploredarjeeling.com), are 
the real founders of modern Nepal and its progressive values. We are 
confronted here with a kind of putsch in reverse: they, the Kirant, had been 
the State.  
But if the Kirant reigned over Nepal and were the founders of such a 
brilliant civilization, how did they manage to become this small group of 
tribes far away in the mountains? In other words, how can they explain this 
divergence between the claimed past and the present? The most widespread 
explanation is simple. Let me quote an indigenist I questioned on this point: 
“Before, we had our king in Kathmandu. At this time, the mudhum 
(‘tradition’, see below) was unique and true. But Hindus arrived, declared 
war on us, and destroyed everything. Everything was divided, and many 
people were killed. They turned us into displaced people”. The origin of the 
decline is identified: Hindus (or Arya; both terms are used as synonyms) are 
guilty. This explanation became a corner stone of indigenist speeches, 
legitimising all identity claims and their vindictive aspects.  
This does not mean that all indigenists express it so bluntly, nor do they 
all think in such a way. It is possible to distinguish two (ideal) types of 
indigenist opinion concerning the place of the Kirant in Nepalese society. 
The ‘moderate’ ones write in favour of a greater recognition of their group, 
but still think of themselves as being integrated into the Nepalese nation; on 
the other hand the ‘hard-liners’ believe that the relationship between the 
Kirant and the Nepalese people only leads to the subordination of the first 
by the second, and that both societies should be segregated. But even the 
‘moderate’ writers express the idea of a kind of Kirant golden age having 
been ‘perverted’ by ‘outsiders’.15 
 
15 Subba, one of the ‘moderate’ writers, wrote in a section called Renaissance and 
Retrogression, “The oral literature of the Limbu reveals that their ancestors have 
experienced a certain level of civilization in the remote past [; they] were enjoying 
prosperous life both culturally and materially in their ancestral land (…). But a long period 
of turbulence afterwards, continuous conflicts among various racial groups, intermittent 
struggles for survival and migration, hostile competition between divergent cultural codes 
(etc) might have caused cessation or discontinuation in the progress of indigenous 
material and non-material culture of Limbu which eventually brought aberration, 
incoherence and even some omissions in the contents of Mundhum” (Subba 1995: 292-
294). Even the rich and analytic book of Subba is not exempt from ambiguity on his 
position, for example in his critique of Dahal’s and Regmi’s (two Nepali anthropologists, 
see Dahal 1983, Regmi 1976) opinion on Kirant (Subba 1999: 41, 105). But we should also 
note that some Kirant writers promote their inclusion in the Hindu world, (Gambhir Rai 
Arya, Swami Prapannacharya) claiming Kirant Aryan origin (Subba 1999: 97). 
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Tanka Bahadur, a ‘hardliner’, expresses it more crudely: the generous 
Kirant granted protection and gave refuge to Aryans who left India. But after 
that, the perfidious Hindus conspired against them, took power by tricking 
them, and tried to suppress any trace of their civilization. “Immediately after 
their settlement in the lands of Kirant, the Licchavis [the dynasty coming 
after the ancient Kirāta] started to conspire and plot against Kirant and to 
spread Hinduism and its values, which eventually made a negative impact 
on the religious and cultural values of Kirāta society” (2043: 116). The 
reason, as he says elsewhere, is that “Hindu society is a non stabilized, 
irregular, insecure society filled with similar characteristics such as cheating, 
insincerity, betrayal, selfishness, individualism, which is based on 
discriminative philosophies” (ibid.: 95). The grievance against Hindus is 
evident. But it is interesting to see that in Tanka Bahadur’s narrative, the 
process of Kirant Hinduisation, which historically took place mainly during 
the nineteenth century, occurred in ancient times (the Licchavis are situated 
from 300 to 800 A.D.). The projection of this process onto many centuries 
leads us in turn to view this mythological history as a metaphorical reading 
of the present.  
Such a historical reconstruction has consequences even in the most 
remote villages. It is perhaps the only major point of these indigenists, 
writings that has a real impact on village life. Dasaĩ is a Nepalese festival in 
honour of the warrior goddess Durgā, during which hierarchical relations 
with regard to authority, e.g. the tālukdār (tax functionary), are reaffirmed 
(Krauskopff and Lecomte 1996). For the last five years, it has not been 
celebrated in my fieldwork area, the remote Hongu valley, Solu-Khumbu 
district, the homeland of the Kulung Rai subgroup. The answer I got when 
questioning a villager about this topic is, “At the time of our king, there were 
no tālukdār, they have been imposed by the Nepalese king. He killed our 
king; he mixed rice in his blood, and made ṭīkā [an auspicious mark] with it. 
That is why we stopped performing Dasaĩ, and that is why now we are 
asking for a new king.” 
 
c. History debate with ‘Hindu’ intellectuals 
As indicated above, the fact that Kirant ruled over Nepal is also accepted by 
the Nepalese intellectual elite. But they, of course, do not draw the same 
conclusion from this fact. As an example, let us briefly introduce the thesis 
of Bhattarai and Joshi on Kirant history. Bhattarai, an Indo-Nepalese writer, 
recognizes Kirant antiquitiy in Nepal, and their specific contribution to the 
construction of the Nepalese nation. Similarly, Joshi writes, “the Kirata 
regime played a significant role in the growth of Nepalese nationalism” 
(1985: 22). In Nepal, anything that clearly distinguishes Nepalese 
civilization from Indian civilization is always a precious argument. But for 
Bhattarai, manifestly a pious Hindu, Kirant were fervent defenders of 
Hinduism. “It is a well proven fact that these Kiratas were Hindus, the main 
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brave Hindu nationality (2017:11)”. He even denies the specificity of Kirant 
languages, arguing that they came from Sanskrit, the “mother of world 
languages” (ibid.: 76). Moreover, he argues that Kirant are in fact of Chetri 
origin (chetri, or kṣatriya, are a high caste traditionally having military and 
political functions). Joshi defends a similar thesis when he writes, “Although 
these Kiratas were of the Mongolian stock which is non-Aryan, they were 
very brave and valorous. So the Aryans, in later times, amalgamated them in 
their own folds (…). This is the very reason why [the laws of] Manu had 
accepted the Kiratas as [one?] of the Kshatriya class” (1985: 24). The laws 
of Manu do in fact refer to a group called Kirāta (but we should not forget 
this word was more or less synonymous with ‘wild men’ or ‘tribesmen’), and 
are described as being kṣatriya degraded to  sūdra status because of their 
rituals and Brahmans’ negligence (Lévi 1905: 77). In Nepal and India, 
several groups (also some Limbu, see Utpreti 1976) present themselves as 
degraded kṣatriya (caused by deceit or self-sacrifice for a good cause) in 
order to reclaim this original status (Sinha 1995).  
But how do we explain the fact that Kirant do not themselves claim this 
prestigious status? Bhattarai’s explanation is that “they remained far from 
the Brahmins and it caused difference in their manners and behaviour. 
Consequently, they forgot to add the word Chetriya to their names” (2017: 
74). It is this non-respect of the Hindu precepts that made Kirant forget 
their origin. Joshi’s explanation of this rupture is more ‘perfidious’ in view of 
the democratic claim of Kirant indigenists: according to him, former Kirant 
were republicans by tradition, but “those Kirata (…) fully well understood 
the political conditions of the South [of India], where the big empires were 
being established and petty republican states were swept away”. This is why 
they adopted the monarchical system (1985: 21). “But it is natural that the 
ancient people had no faith in the monarchical system, because they were 
brought up in republicanism. This was the reason why the ancient tribes of 
Nepal, revolting against the Kirata, had driven them out of the country” 
(ibid.: 23). 
Thus Kirant are Chetri without knowing it; this is an argument 
frequently used by Indian nationalists to reintegrate ‘tribesmen’ into the 
bosom of Indian hierarchy. As Pandey notes, “in the case of many tribal and 
untouchable communities, it is commonly argued that they are ‘fallen’ 
Hindus, Hindus who do not know (or have forgotten) that they are Hindus 
and need to be taught this truth” (Pandey 1993: 257). In our case, Indo-
Nepalese writers counter upon themselves a status craved by many groups 
on the South Asian subcontinent:16 everybody wants to be a kṣatriya, 
because a kṣatriya is a ruler. But Kirant indigenists do not want the Kirāta 
to be recognized as kṣatriya rulers, they want the (ruling) function without 
the caste! Now their primary wish is to be distinguished from the Hindu 
 
16 See S. Sinha on the relation between the tribal people of Central India and the kṣatriya 
(Rajput) model (1995).  
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world. Let us just mention that when confronting different views on politics, 
both types of intellectuals make use of historical arguments in order to 
justify their particular vision of the cultural heritage of their nation.17 
 
II. Revisiting the present 
 
a. Reinvention of tradition 
For Kirant indigenists history gives sufficient evidence: after ‘Hindus’ have 
destroyed everything the Kirant have to reconstruct their heritage, and their 
social fabric has to be renewed as well. Indigenists’ debates focus in 
particular on religion, which offers the most powerful social fabric, and this 
leads to the reinvention of tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). 
For most Rai living in their ancestral villages the religious system (called 
mudhum) is ritualistic knowledge and savoir-faire, necessitating neither 
devotion nor meditation, nor even explicit moral values, but respect for the 
ancestral order concerning the way to deal with spiritual forces. As the 
Kirant traditional religious system is clearly different from Hinduism, in 
local communities few conflicts occur with the Hindu world.18 First, their 
tradition concerns a specific way of life in a specific area transmitted by their 
own ancestors. Consequently, there is a kind of intrinsic relativism in their 
conception of tradition: each group has different ancestors, hence different 
traditions. But in specific situations, Hinduism serves as a reference point, 
i.e. when dealing with exterior forces (like forest deities, roaming spirits) 
and when invoking specialists (shamans) able to deal with them, or when 
citing common Hindu myths. Since these fields are, in principle, shared by 
all, such knowledge is expected to be common to all groups. This conception 
of unity in diversity is in harmony with the caste system.19 Secondly, there is 
no equivalence between the mudhum, which can be translated as ‘tradition’, 
and Hinduism, refered to as dharma. Rai from villages are reluctant to 
translate mudhum as ‘dharma’ (as indigenists often do); the meaning of 
mudhum is closer to what anthropologists sometimes call the ‘little 
 
17 The political message of these historical writings is clearly perceived, and sometimes 
affirmed. For example, an article published in the Nepal Digest (“Ancient Kirant were 
Hindus?”, 06/07/94) concludes: “The icon of this rejection [of Hindu heritage] is the 
rejection of the Sanskrit language for schools by the modern day Kirats”. 
18 By ‘Hindu world’, I mean the normative socio-religious conceptions and attitudes of the 
high caste people and of the Nepal state (e.g. “Brahmanism”). On the relation between 
Hindus and Kirant, see Jones (1976), Gaenszle (1993), Allen (1997).  
19 As Dumont writes, “In the hierarchical scheme a group’s acknowledged differentness 
whereby it is contrasted with other groups becomes the very principle whereby it is 
integrated into society” (1970: 191). 
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tradition’.20 A villager explained to me: “We, Rai, have only little dharma”, 
as if having no dharma were not conceivable for the Rai. But mudhum is not 
the same as dharma. The latter term relates to supreme beings (e.g. 
Bhagavān) which are described as “what people from everywhere worship”. 
It is understood as a universal and divine principle transcending all religious 
traditions, explaining why villagers are receptive to such Hindu ideas.  
But for indigenists, villagers are wrong: “even the Kirāta today do not 
know anything about Kirāta religion” (Rai 2055: 28).  Villagers are said to 
have misunderstood their own religion, and “being unable to find their own 
independent religion, the Kiratese have been travelling in a world of 
darkness for a long time. Without knowing what to do, some of them took 
up Hindu religion and some Buddhist” (Tandukar 1980: 45). And therefore, 
“Kirant are losing their language, script but also themselves” (Rai 2052: 1). 
According to indigenists, “Kirāta festivals and traditions are not only totally 
different, but in fact almost opposite to Hindu values” (Rai 2043: 93). So the 
mudhum is the real religion of the Kirant (some indigenists say of all 
autochthonous people), but “it has been perverted by the conspiracy of 
Aryans”, and “if we find any influence of Hinduism [and in fact, there is], it 
is only because of the process of conversion imposed on Kirāta by the 
government”.21 This leads to a wish to ‘purify’ it from any Hindu influence. 
And if not suppressed, those Hindu elements are being reinterpreted: e.g., 
Tihar, Lakshmi’s festival, became the commemoration of an ancient Kirant 
king22 (see web site: msnepal.org/reports_pubs/ekchin/jan2000/7.htm). 
The struggle has now moved on to the domain of religion. As religion is 
perceived as being the “spirit of the group directing Kirant’s life” (Khambu 
2052: 13), Kirant identity depends on its preservation. The political aspect of 
religion is evident23 and clearly perceived by some indigenists, such as 
Bhuidal Rai, who claims: “because to accept others religions means to accept 
a defeat in the religions battle [sic], (…) and to accept to be governed by 
others”(Rai 2052: 4).24 Bhuidal Rai argues in favour of changing Kirant 
 
20 It is interesting that in the area caste people like Chetri also use the word mundhum to 
specifically qualify ritual practices concerning local spirits not present in ‘pure’ Hinduism. 
21 Subba has a quite different view on the question. For him, Kirant religion shares 
similarities with Hinduism, but this is mainly due to pre-Aryan (e.g. Kirant ) influence on 
the formation of Hinduism (Subba 1995: chap.XV).  
22 The fundamentals of Kirant nationalism are well formulated by Subba: “(re)creating the 
Kirata nation, which means picking up certain commonalities and ignoring the differences 
within the groups categorized here as ‘Kirata’; and two, showing how much such features 
differ from those existing among other categories, particularly the Tagadharis [high castes 
carrying sacred tread]” (Subba 1999: 84). 
23 As Sales writers, “it may be more accurate to see religion as the frame within which 
people make politics” (1999: 81). 
24 Rai criticizes a number of adverse religious communities who influenced the Kirant. For 
example, he presents them as sources of factionalism (or communalism). In South Asia, 
this argument is commonly used to criticize ethnic movements, as any movement fights 
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religion’s “bad” aspects, such as killing animals and drinking alcohol, 
explaining these negative features are not religious, but cultural (though he 
accepts the Hindu model of purity). But even to rid Kirant religion from its 
“bad” cultural aspects and from external influences in order to find again its 
original purity is not enough. Bhuidal Rai goes further and proposes to 
“revise our own authentic religion”, and explains that “it is really true that 
today we need a completely new vision and work about religion. Our Kirāta 
community needs to start something new in this matter. Even our attempt 
would not be a universal one, it should be competitive. We don’t want to be 
late even in religion” (2052: 7).  
For most of the indigenists, the objective is clear: the Kirant have to 
(re)discover their ‘real’ religion. Their religion is not the kind of jumble 
anthropologists can actually study in remote villages. For indigenists, the 
mudhum, the original religion of the Kirant, is one of the oldest in the world: 
“Kirāta had already their own religion before other religions existed and 
spread all over the world” (Rai 2055: 26). This knowledge of the universe 
given by the ancestors forms “one of the world’s most beautiful epics”, often 
compared with the Mahābhārata or the Bible. The mudhum is sometimes 
presented as a kind of positivist religion with a scientific basis, but also 
mystical (based on devotion, meditation), offering supernatural power (like 
vision of the past and of the future, apparition, illumination, telepathy…). It 
is also perceived as a moral and ethical religion, teaching love and tolerance 
(principles sometimes expressed as the ten commandments25). It is also a 
philosophy leading to harmony between land and nature, and it is political, 
giving “the guidelines for the creation of a beautiful human society”.  
Such a religion has to have respectable gods, not like those worshiped by 
villagers, who are closer to roaming spirits than a supreme god. If ancestors 
are still present in indigenists’ discourse (they are “the source of energy and 
power”), mudhum is mainly defined as a ‘worship of nature’ referring to 
‘mother earth’, and a devotion to supreme gods. The main god for the Limbu 
is Yuma (also called Niwaphuma). She is described as “the ultimate and 
supreme deity. She is omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, infinite and 
eternal” (Subba 1995: 284). And in the case of the Rai, there is an emerging 
consensus that the main gods are Paruhang and Sumnima.26  
 
for interests of a particular group. Secondly, it shows Hindu and Christian religious acts as 
non-economic and governed by political manipulation. Both arguments are frequent in 
Christian and communist rhetoric of conversion.  
25 This term suggests Christian and/or Buddhist influence (the ‘tenth sin’, mi dge ba gcu). 
26 Ironically both Paruhang-Sumina and Yuma are identified by villagers as Shiva/Parvati. 
All Rai groups identify Paruhang as their first male ancestor and as being Shiva. According 
to Sagant, Limbu associate Yuma with Parvati, Shiva’s wife (1996: 295). Some indigenists 
recognize this link: (“Shivaism is our main religion” wrote Bam Bahadur Rai 2055: 27), 
while others, as Tanka Bahadur Rai, deny it: “Kirāta used to live in this area for thousands 
of years and since then they believe in authentic mundhum religion since. It is only after a 
long time that Aryan Hindus entered Kirāta land as refugees. They tried to attract Kirāta 
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I should also mention graphic (or iconic) representations, which 
necessarily are a part of a respected religion. While some explain the 
absence of any representation in a positive way (“just like Buddhism, they do 
not worship any image and regard light or knowledge as their god, which is 
omni-present,” Tandukar 1980: 53), others try to prove the existence of such 
representations.27 
 
b. Shamanic speech and sacred books  
But how do these indigenists legitimise their claim to define true religion? A 
difficulty with putting the mudhum and universal religions on an equal level 
lies in the former’s lack of a script. For most Kirant, the absence of books is 
perceived as a big problem, and it is interesting to look at the Kirant 
relationship to scripture. They encounter it mainly in two ways: through 
Hindu, Buddhist, and later Christian sacred books, and through the 
Nepalese administration. In both cases, the existence and use of a script was 
perceived as contributing to the power of these institutions: it is partly the 
Kirants’ ignorance of any script that has led to their loss in the struggle for 
land ownership. So we could see the promotion of a Kirant script as a 
response to the wish to possess such a powerful tool. But in fact, indigenists 
claim that the Kirant already possess a script. “Long after, some Kiratese 
such as Mr. Imansing Chemjong and others, were able to discover their own 
religion beautifully written in old manuscripts” (Tandukar 1980: 47). 
Therefore, indigenists are able to speak of a true religion.28  
Unfortunately this script, dating from the end of 18th century, was based 
on a Sanskrit and Tibetan model and has never been used by the population 
(Vansittart 1896/1992: 135). Kirant intellectuals had two main concerns 
regarding this script: to prove its great antiquity, and to prove that it was the 
specific property of the Kirant. It is said to have been invented by Srijanga, a 
 
in their religion through many ways. Thus they created a hypothetical god having the same 
characteristics as Kirāta. They called him Shiva, who used to drink alcohol, takes all kind 
of hallucinogens and if angry destroys everything (…). Thus, the reason behind relating 
Paruhang to Shiva is a conspiracy to convert Kirāta to Hindu religion. But Rai are not 
confused by this funny and baseless attempt and will never be (Rai 2049: 47). It would 
take too long to explain the reasons for this identification of Shiva with Kirant. Concerning 
the importance of Shiva’s figure in Nepal, notably among tribal people, see Bouillier 1992). 
27 Among such common representations are the re-appropriation of the Mahadev 
Kirateshvar statues (an old statue of Shiva in the Kathmandu Valley having slanting eyes), 
a now widespread picture of Yelambar (a famous – but hypothetical – Kirant king, victim 
of his frankness and honesty but having the “dubious honour of being slain by Lord 
Krishna himself”), Srijanga (the father of Limbu script, a martyr, represented in Saint 
Sebastian’s posture, bristling with arrows), or the Subhas Rai paintings representing Shiva 
and Parvati with Mongol faces and traditional Kirant ornaments. 
28 On the relation to script among local groups, see Oppitz 1998 and Carrin 2002. This 
rediscovering of sacred book also evokes the Tibetan ‘hidden-treasures’ (terma); see 
Blondeau 1999.  
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Limbu who was a former Buddhist monk from Sikkim and who was killed on 
the orders of a Sikkimese ruler because of his political activities (Chemjong 
1967: 107). Based on the existence of another person called Srijanga in the 
7th century, some conclude that this script was created then, and on top of 
that, they present the second Srijanga as an incarnation of the first 
(Chemjong 1967: 49). Consequently, this script is associated with an ancient 
king and with a religious leader, who died like a martyr. This first ‘historical 
figure’ represents the symbol of the Kirant golden age when they had a 
country, while the second represents the Kirant decline, which is due to 
foreign forces. 
If the Kirant have such a script, where are the books? The rhetoric is the 
same as the one employed with respect to politics: “First we had our Kings, 
we had our books, and Mudhum was unique and true, but the Hindus 
destroyed everything. So Mudhum had to be reproduced orally by shamans. 
But the shamans distorted and deteriorated it”, a member of an indigenist 
movement explained to me. The existence of a script is perceived as the 
foundation of respectability and unity of a culture. This is particularly 
conclusive because of the handicap caused by the mudhum’s diversity that 
shows disunity among the Kirant people. For indigenists, the Kirants’ 
linguistic diversity is the most obvious sign of their disunion. So finding a 
script for their language means fixing and unifying it.  
Having a script enables them to claim a prestigious standardized 
religion, but also “to maintain, preserve, develop and standardize our 
endangered Kirat mother tongue” (Dhan Raj Rai, Rising Nepal, Sept. 20, 
2000). This goal, the preservation of culture through language, is the main 
basis of the Kirant associations since the beginning: they have tried to 
promote their languages written in Srijanga’s script from the beginning of 
the 20th century. All these associations give priority to the work on language 
(like publishing dictionaries, novels, or sacred books in Kirant languages, 
retranscription of myths and of ritual speech). Actually, the Limbu script is 
taught in Sikkim (around 5000 students in 1988). This fact, perceived as an 
important victory, encourages the Kirant in Nepal to be more assertive with 
their demand to implement the teaching of ethnic language at schools 
(legally allowed but never implemented).  
 
c. Putting history into practice: The ritual dances of the soil  
To sum up, the new ‘refreshed’ version of the mudhum tradition, adapted to 
modern values and transformed into a religion (i.e. rationalised, 
intellectualised and moralised), is said to be the basis for identity 
preservation; that is why it has to be unique. The difficulty is that the 
mudhum not only displays significant variations in theory, as we have seen, 
but also in practice. Indigenists want to minimize or deny any variation and 
put forward new unified practices to promote it.  
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The ‘chosen’ federating element is the ritual dance (called Sakewa, 
Sakela, Chandi, Sili, Yalang, etc. according to the groups), presented as an 
“intrinsic entity of Kirant culture.”29 Effectively, despite important 
variations of details, Rai and Limbu communities all practice ritual dances. 
These dances are usually performed once or several times a year, depending 
on the agricultural calendar, with people (only men or both men and 
women) usually dancing in a circle, accompanied by cymbals and/or drums, 
while dancers sometimes mime agricultural acts. For villagers, these dances 
are to ensure agricultural prosperity by pleasing the ancestors and the Land 
(perceived as a kind of divine entity).  
Despite important local variations, indigenists view these dances as 
specific as well as common to all Kirant (Gaenszle 1997: 367). Following a 
policy of promoting them as their cultural heritage that should be nationally 
recognized, these dances are now performed in public in cities of Nepal and 
Sikkim (where they are considered as ‘state holidays’). It is easy to 
understand why these dances have been chosen as a federative Kirant 
symbol. It is one of the few rituals performed collectively, and is present 
among all Kirant groups. Moreover, dance is a pleasant and apparently 
neutral folkloric practice, often the only kind of ethnic manifestation that 
the State tolerated. But it is something of a paradox that urban people 
should have chosen a rural cult with the aim of requesting agricultural 
prosperity from the ancestors, the symbolic landowners. Of course, 
indigenists have introduced significant changes, reflecting a wish to purify 
the cult (no blood sacrifice, no alcoholic drinks), to modernize it (e.g. using a 
sacred book in a modern permanent temple), and to give it more “noble” 
motivations, such as the feeling of togetherness in mystical harmony with a 
deified nature.  
In Kathmandu these dances are followed by a ritual carried out three 
days later. On the full moon day of maṅgsir (November-December), the 
Chasok ritual of ubhaũli (the ‘descending time’), was performed in Sano 
Hattiban (in Patan). It was organized by Kirat Rai Yayokkha, Kirat Yakthum 
Chumlung, Kirat Yakka Chuma and Sunuwar Sewa Samaj associations, but 
seemed to be controlled by members of the Phalgunanda sect.30 According 
to C. Subba (1995: 46), Chasok, or Chasok-Thisok, is a harvest ritual 
 
29 As each Kirant sub-group has its own rituals, it is difficult to find any unifying ritual 
events. Some indigenists emphasise life-cycle rituals because they vary less than others; 
that is with good reason: they are strongly influence by Hindu practice.  
30 Apparently, a similar “important Kirant religious festival where thousand of people 
participate” is organized every year, in the village of Laramba (Bajho VDC, Ilam district). 
This festival, called Yakwasewa Maha Astayangya, is realized in honour of ‘Lord 
Kiranteshwar’, as well as for praying to the gods “for good harvest and for welcoming the 
coming of spring”. It is organized by Atmananda Lingden, ‘great priest’ of the 
Kiranteshwar temple, with support of the Association for the Upliftment of Kirant Religion 
and Literature (adepts of the Satyahangma Dharma, i.e. Phalgunanda’s religion). (See 
Suman Pradhan, Katmandu Post, Jan. 20, 2000). 
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dedicated to Yuma (but includes several other gods), conducted by the 
Limbu community, individually as well as collectively. It includes animal 
sacrifices as well as alcohol, and is a festive celebration. In this case, the 
atmosphere is quite different. It was described to me as a land (bhūmī) and 
harvest (bali) festival addressed to the supreme god, Bhagavān. The ritual 
took place on top of a small hill where these associations plan to build a big 
temple. The ritual area was composed of a large platform with pyramidal 
terraces in the middle. Close to it, there was a big trident surrounded by two 
large bells, and a little further a triangular fireplace. The entire area was 
decorated with flower garlands and prayer flags (on which are words in the 
Srijanga script) flying above benches with moons and suns painted on them, 
reminiscent of the commemorative resting places built after funerals in 
Kirant communities. On the pyramidal terraces and on the ground, offerings 
brought by devotees and ritual paraphernalia could be seen (such as incense, 
candles, fruits, flowers oil for lamps). Men and women, young and old, all 
Kirant, were gathering, mainly from the urban middle class. The ritual 
borrows a mix of Hindu and Buddhist elements, with some Kirant symbols 
such as the two-headed drum, and ritual books written in Srijanga script. 
The performance consisted mainly of ritual speeches by the priest, while 
devotees walked clockwise three times around the altar and the fireplace (as 
it is common in Kirant rituals) for praying. The performance ended with a 
vegetarian and non-alcoholic communal meal (prasād) and the giving of 
ṭikā (auspicious mark). Except for some details, hardly anything was 
reminiscent of village rituals; rather the ritual organisation evoked sectarian 
Hindu practices.  
But since there are no community links between ancestors and villagers, 
the raison d’être of the original ritual, is this cult not an empty shell 
transplanted into a city? By celebrating such a cult in the heart of 
Kathmandu, do these people, claiming a direct filiation with the glorious 
Kirant Kings, perhaps try to express their rights to the soil, their soil?31 
Different Western researchers have argued that such a cult of the soil, 
known as bhūme, could have developed among tribal groups from Nepal as a 
response to Indo-Nepalese domination on the land (Lecomte-Tilouine 1996, 
Krauskopff 1996). These cults are perhaps a continuation of this 
phenomenon. Kirant indigenists all insist on their privileged and symbiotic 
relationship with the motherland, as a Limbu leader, Manju Yakthumba, 
stated in a discussion on indigenous people and territorial rights during a 
 
31 Slusser points out that in “Tikhel, southwest of the old city [of Patan, Kathmandu Valley] 
proper, Kiranti recently restored a shrine in deference to their tradition that a Kirāta 
temple once stood there.” And she concludes “What, if not some ancient association, 
should bring modern Kirantis of distant and inaccessible eastern Nepal to a particular 
temple site in Patan, or induce them to foregather about their clan god at a secluded spot 
in the interior of the city?” (1982: 96).  
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UN conference. He did so by refering to Caplan:32 “Kipat [traditional land 
tenure and ancestral territory] is fused with and articulates the culture, and 
any assault on Kipat is seen as a threat to the very existence of the Limbu as 
a separate community within the society.”33 
We now understand how these dances can be quite subversive folklore. 
They are performed during all cultural programs, and these programs as 
well as the booklets previously mentioned are always media used to express 
criticism of Brahman domination, the status of Hinduism as a national 
religion, the teaching of Sanskrit, the low political representation of ethnic 
minorities or the question of land ownership. Some demands are more 
concrete. For example, Kirant associations did obtain the governmental 
recognition of a religious forest (Kirat Dharmik Ban) in Lalitpur and of a 
Kirant graveyard which had to be destroyed because it was situated in a 
Hindu temple’s garden as Kirant sacred areas. Another aim of the campaign 
was to declare the ‘Kirant Hangsam Mojollug Manghim’ area (Banjho VDC, 
Ilam district) a religious place, as part of the world's cultural heritage, and 
the recognition of the Kirant dance ceremony as a national holiday. Kirant 
associations send volunteers campaigning for Kirant community members 
to register as Kirant in the census because census figures are always 
perceived as of great political importance: the numerical importance of a 
group is a sign of its political force (Cohn 1987). Moreover, after the 1999 
census, the Kirant activists gained the right to add ‘Kirantism’ as a new 
religious category.34 
 
Conclusion 
In the indigenists’ scheme of historical analysis everything is linked: the 
ancient and glorious Kirant nation was governed by true religion, educating 
 
32 Caplan's famous study (1970) focuses on the relationship between high caste Hindus 
and Limbu and describes this process as a progressive appropriation of Limbu lands and 
power by the Indo-Nepalese. This book has been recently criticized by Dahal as partial, 
showing Limbu “as an innocent and naive people, in stark contrast to the Brahmins who 
are portrayed as cheats or otherwise dishonest in their dealing” 
(himalmag.com/96may/deviant.htm). Regarding the criticism of occidental researchers' 
clear-cut opposition between “Hindus” and “Tribals” see also Sharma 1978.  
33 Concerning the Limbu mythology’s emphasis on the relation to their territory, see 
Gaenszle (2002). On the declaration of the Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN) 
made in 1994 after a UN Resolution calling for a decade of Indigenous Peoples, see Gellner 
(1997: 20). This declaration shows the wish to present the ‘Indigenous People of Nepal’ as 
being not Hindus but Animists and as being the first settlers of Nepal, but ‘displaced from 
their own land’ and subjugated by the State.  
34 It is interesting that less than 40% of Kirant regard themselves as belonging to ‘Kirant 
religion’ (1999 census). Apparently the more communities are influenced by Hinduism 
and disintegrated, the more the answer is positive (32% for eastern mountain area, 46% 
for eastern hills and 53% for eastern Terai). It shows a low influence of the indigenist 
thesis on rural Kirant people.  
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people with a moral principle and a rich modernist and socialist philosophy, 
and unifying people in regard to their ancestors and land. The religion is 
defined in holy books, ensuring its purity, unity and perpetuity. But Aryans 
invaded the country, destroyed their society, burnt their books, occupied 
their land, divided the Kirant, and marginalized them. These outsiders are 
the cause of Kirant disunity and of the perversion of the Kirants’ traditions. 
This finally led to the disintegration of the mudhum and the loss of harmony 
between the Kirant, their land and their ancestors, and was moreover the 
cause of their current poverty, backwardness, and low political 
representation. While the struggle is founded upon historical arguments, 
numerous claims are very specific and refer to current economic, social and 
political issues. Through the promotion of language, culture, religion and a 
new version of their history, indigenists’ wishes lead to more aggressive 
actions, like the defence of political and economic interests and land 
ownership rights. It is clear how this vision of the past legitimises the claim 
to their lost rights and to the nation they should inherit. And since material 
aims are linked to spiritual ones, the Kirants’ desire to regain their lost 
rights inevitably involves the re-establishment of the mudhum. 
Subsequently, inventing the past is inheriting the future.  
Everything could conjure up a messianic movement except for one 
important point: messianic movements are linked to political projects, 
usually focused on a charismatic leader. Up to now, nobody has emerged as 
a leader (except Phalgunanda, but his movement was short-lived). The 
endemic tendency to fragmentation of the Kirant movement (despite the 
wish of unity always claimed in all discourses) and the confrontational and 
generalized politicisation of Nepalese life35 prevent any unity. Moreover, it 
creates a rupture with the more traditional view of inter-community 
relations. By trying to give their culture a noble character, in the course of 
time indigenists adapt it to the current standard values of the dominant 
Nepalese culture of urban elites, ironically mainly urban high caste Hindus. 
The most obvious example is the appropriation of the ancient Kirāta 
genealogies to claim, on a typically Hindu royal model, to be the first settlers 
and rulers of Nepal. Indeed, all indigenists are from the urban middle class 
and the form of their contestation can partially be understood as a response 
to their exclusion from the social status group they emulate.36  
They do have specific values, but they are also inspired by external ideas: 
military values represented by the British, communist social claims, a 
 
35 According to Subba, Kirant indigenist organizations are no exception to the rule. For 
example, the Kirant Yakthung Chumlung is close to the United Marxist-Leninist Party 
while Kirant Yakthung Songchumbo is pro-Nepali Congress (1999: 122).  
36 Weiner argues that “nativism tends to be associated with a blockage to social mobility 
for the native population by culturally distinguishable migrant population” (1978). For a 
more general analysis of the relationship between the “tribal” and the “Hindu civilisation”, 
see Sinha 1981.  
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rhetoric of development, a special relationship with nature, influenced by 
the Western infatuation with animist religions perceived as intrinsically 
ecological. Even this claim to be the original inhabitants of the country can 
be seen as a consequence of the British legal framework established in India 
(see, for example, Bates 1994). The wish to have a culture independent from 
the dominant one leads them to reconstruct their culture in total opposition 
to their “enemies”. By doing so, the rejected culture still remains a model: a 
mirror version, but still a model37. I tried to show briefly that villagers 
inscribe their tradition in their locality but think of it as integrated in a wider 
context, showing unity in diversity. By contrast, indigenists build a new 
culture in total opposition to the dominant ones but, in the end, similarly 
oriented: everything is done to show the cultural gaps between ‘Hindus’ and 
Kirant, but religious, economic and political goals are in fact much the same. 
There is a feeling of diversity in unity. 
Such a position led to the relatively slight indigenist influence on the 
majority of Kirant still living in rural areas. Even though, as we have seen, 
villagers accept the historical part of this reconstruction and its political 
implication, such as is evident from the boycott of the Dasaĩ festival, they 
still adhere to their traditional vision of religion. And it is rather the growing 
Maoist movement that has become the outlet of increasing anger. The 
armed Rai movement of the Khambuwan Mukti Morcha has joined and is 
now almost assimilated to that of the Maoists.38 
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